THE TWO AMERICAS,

GREAT BRITAIN,

AND

THE HOLY ALLIANCE.

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AN apprehension has been expressed, by some worthy men, that, although Great Britain publicly disclaims the views of the Holy Alliance, she holds a secret concert with them in the designs which they menace against Republican institutions, and against North and South America; and that she is particularly hostile to North America, from an apprehension of the growth of our naval power.

It may be admitted at once, that her jealousy of American naval power is real; taking her historical career, and the nature of her own power and policy into consideration, it may even be admitted that she is naturally so. But if her general policy be examined, it will be found that there are motives of action much more imperative, which must now neutralize that jealousy. Any apprehension of our navy must be prospective and remote. Present and more comprehensive causes affect her policy, and command her influence at the present day. It may be useful, however, to examine this subject, were it only to settle opinions, or to quiet honest doubts.

The policy of Great Britain is as profound as it is constant to its purpose. The power and predomi-

nance of Great Britain among nations, and her internal riches and prosperity, proceed out of causes wholly artificial; her insular position is the sole advantage which she derives from nature; and while it is the means of her security, it is also a spring of her ambition. It is on that internal industry which forms the cargoes for her commercial fleets; and on the universal commerce which that industry sustains, her power and prosperity rest. Its perpetuation and augmentation therefore become her paramount policy. It is her self-defence—her sole existence—her revenue—her riches—and her naval power is essential to the whole, as by this establishment her commerce is secured, and by its protection she is enabled to levy tribute on all nations, and to tax the people of every country with the industry of her own.

The statesmen of England know precisely the extent and necessity of these sources of wealth and power. They know that it is not from her own natural productions this power is derived; but that it is the common result of a well combined process, which profits by the neglect, the incapacity, or the impolicy of other nations, and converts even the natural productions of other nations, by means of arts and ingenious labor, into means of riches and revenue; from the rude natural material of a foreign nation, which her workmen and her machinery augment tenfold in value, she augments her own riches by the nine augmented parts, which the original producer of the commodity pays, without suspicion, or with a most extraordinary indifference.

The politicians of Great Britain are perfectly aware that her power and safety depend on the maintenance of her commercial system, and that without

it she must sink to the rank of Sardinia or Corsica; for which reason they cannot be indifferent nor insensible to the declarations and pretensions of the Holy Alliance, which would, if realized on other nations, leave her only the last to be devoured. They know, that although the Holy Alliance combined with England, against the alarming approaches of France to internal and commercial greatness, that the continental powers have adopted that very continental system projected by Napoleon, which was with them all a pretended cause of war. The ministers of England have been compelled to seek in the Asiatic Archipelago, and in the newly emancipated nations of America, markets to supply the places of those of which continental European policy had denied them. England already abandons the north of Europe, and seeks for her supplies of hemp in Asia and America, where it can be procured in greater abundance and of better quality. The British statesmen are persuaded that the success of the Holy Alliance would be fatal to her power; and that they argue wisely there can be no sober doubt.

The importance of commerce to Great Britain, and particularly that of the United States, was never so manifest nor so seriously ascertained, as during the late war. It was felt in every avenue of British interest—her manufactures were paralyzed, her exchanges arrested, her social order disturbed, and the revenue of the capitalist, and that of the nation diminished; the landed interest felt it in the failure of markets for their products; the fund-holders in the fall of their stocks; and most seriously in the emigration of many thousands of expert and experienced artists, deprived of employment at home, driven to sedition by desperation, where they could not emigrate; and

where emigration was successful, the skill of England was transferred to all the nations of Europe, who have since become her rivals in arts, and whose policy has excluded the productions of England, in order to preserve their home productive industry against British competition.

Perhaps it may be too much to attribute these consequences wholly to the late war with the United States; still it is not unreasonable to say, that much more is to be attributed to this cause than to any other; but these conclusions are beyond question, that the experience of last war has shown more forcibly than before, the importance of the North American market, and rendered that of South America still more necessary and precious.

The policy adopted on the European continent, has probably lost to England a sum exceeding the whole amount of British commerce, with all parts of the world at the commencement of Queen Anne's reign; while the augmentation of her commerce with the United States, since 1783, is much greater than that amount. Seven-eighths of her European market has been wrested from her. America, North and South, must be proportionably valuable and valued.

These observations are intended to show, that whatever may be her jealousy of our navy, the cause of apprehension is remote; while the policy of her commerce is present and pressing—requiring more care to preserve it now than at any former period. The market of the United States must continue to be essential to England, unless it were possible that she could find in other parts of the world, markets competent to the consumption of her whole production without the United States.

The same principles which render the United States' market precious to England, apply with as much force to those of the new states of the South. The field is neither new to England. nor untried, and by the analogy afforded from the United States, during forty years of independence, South America presents a commercial theatre so vast, rich, and various, that it is probably in England alone it is properly and fully estimated. More than a century since, she found in South America one of the great springs by which her political machinery has obtained the greatest impulse since. It is from the augmented means drawn by her long experience from those rich regions, that she placed herself at the head of the powers of Europe, made emperors and kings her stipendiaries, and by their agency prostrated her rival.

The authorized piracies of Anson, and the lawless enterprizes of the pirate Morgan, were to England the means of developing South American wealth, and exciting those desires which have ever since directed her unwearied ambition towards the precious riches of America. The commerce to which access had been obtained at various times through Ferrol and Carthagena, and ultimately through Seville, and Cadiz, was contemporaneous with the illicit commerce through Carthagena des Indias, Chagres, and the Atrato, all the coasts of Terra Firma, and the Mexican sea, and were carried on through Jamaica; a similar contraband carried on with Chili, Peru, and Mexico, on the coast of the Pacific, and the isthmus of Panama, altogether contraband, taught the statesmen of Great Britain, not only of what value South America was, but shows them now what she may be, when free and independent. Her interests are involved in American

freedom; the treasures would remain buried, or would escape to other hands, if the new states could possibly be subjugated. They cannot be conquered from natural and insuperable causes; if they could be, it would not be the policy of England to prevent it—she could, and she would, prevent it.

An experienced public functionary, laid before the Cortez, at Cadiz, when first assembled there, a Report on the Commerce of South America: He stated the contraband commerce to be equal to seven parts of ten; the lawful as three parts only. This contraband was shared in some measure with the Dutch Islands, and with the French at St. Domingo; but the English possessed the greatest portion of all. These resources were much more important to the West Indies than all their sugar and coffee; and it was the same kind of contraband, through St. Domingo, which supplied France with that vast mass of the precious metals, with which she abounded at the period of the Revolution, and which, when St Domingo was wrested from France, produced a paralysis, the cause of which appear not to be generally seen or suspected.

Those channels of commerce have undergone great changes. Cadiz is no longer the central and exclusive depot of the commerce and riches of all Spanish America. Cadiz no longer transfers to England three-fifths of its commercial wealth, in exchange for the manufactures of her workshops; Jamaica has, at the same time, acquired all that Cuba and St. Domingo lost of the contraband, and of the direct trade, now that all the ports of America are open. It is no longer a monopoly of a single European port; it is now a free open trade, regular and augmenting, and while the fair commerce exceeds its former value to

an incalculable extent, the contraband continues and is tripled in its former amount. The gold, silver, and platina, of South America, pass almost exclusively to British ports; while the amount of British exports, and thence the value of South American commerce to England may be appreciated.

At the commencement of the year 1823, an eminent South American, whose duties led him to the inquiry, ascertained that there was then due to England upon mercantile credits in the states south of the Isthmus, above $ 37,000,000. Mr. Lowe, an English merchant concerned in that trade, in a work published the 6th July, 1823, alleges that the exports to Buenos Ayres and Valpariso alone, amounted to the following sums:

	Buenos Ayres.	Valpariso.
In the year ending Jan. 5, 1813,	$ 2,021,000	
1814,	(Not accessible.)	
1815,	2,290,760	
1816,	2,146,525	
1817,	1,692,085	
1818,	3,325,675	$ 163,985
1819,	3,399,510	84,015
1820,	1,797,980	88,510
1821,	3,427,185	722,070
1822,	3,195,605	1,889,945
1823,	5,808,825	2,314,840

These shipments were only to *two* remote ports, and mark not merely the magnitude of the open regular trade, but its increases, and it is certain that the illicit trade exceeds it in amount. But the trade to Jamaica, which is the entrepot of the Columbian Terra Firma, Chagres, Panama, the Atrato, the coast

of Yucatan, and Guatimala, and Mexico, is not less striking.

In the year	1813,	shipped for Jamaica	$ 13,106,470
	1814,	- -	(not accessible.)
	1815,	- - -	16,802,110
	1816,	- - -	21,200,940
	1817,	- - -	14,286,715
	1818,	- - -	23,673,625
	1819,	- - -	17,306,295
	1820,	- - -	17,774,675
	1821,	- - -	12,637,810
	1822,	- - -	17,262,710
	1823,	- - -	12,529,175

These shipments were made for Jamaica only; besides which, very large shipments were made for the South American market and Mexico direct, as well as for the Isthmus, Guaiana, Havanna, Trinidad, Demarara, St. Thomas, and Curacoa. But another item of shipments from the single port of Liverpool, in the year 1823, for the South American market, marks the extent and growth of that commerce—the amount being for British goods alone, at the export custom house price, $ 34,000,000; and no article in that trade produces less than 100 per cent., on many articles 500 per cent.

The commercial agents which Great Britain has sent to Columbia, Mexico, La Plata, Chili, and Peru; their number, the means placed at their disposal, and the efficiency of the provisions, by which they are enabled to form connexions, establish influence, and procure information, show how well they understand the manner of promoting their national interests, and the value they set upon the independence of South America. The separation of America from Spanish

domination and dependance, is therefore a great commercial object to England, and its security becomes a part of her inflexible policy. The revolution of North America had taught England that the commerce of a free and independent nation could be tenfold more precious than that of the same countries bowed down by colonial subjection and monopoly. The West India colonies, compared with the single nation of Columbia, have become an inferior object; and if she could accomplish it without difficulty or danger, she would abandon those islands to-morrow: her policy, ever since the close of the North American revolution, has tended in that direction, and all the parade of benevolence towards the negro race and the slave trade, the whole clamor about negro emancipation and colonization, has had their incentive in that policy, commencing with the shortlived but generous principles of the Rockingham administration, adopted by Pitt, notwithstanding the mixt character of his administration and the powerful influence of the West India interest in Parliament. These views duly weighed. must show the importance justly attached to South American commerce, by a nation whose existence is wholly dependent on commerce. The products in which payments are made for her fabrics, are, many of them, peculiar to that section of the earth, and are in demand throughout the civilized world. Gold, gold dust, gold bars, silver in bars and in plata pena, platina, copper, precious stones; balsams, gums, drugs, dyestuffs, fine woods, mahogany, timber, cotton, cacao, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cochineal, rice, peas, beans, mules, horses, and hides, &c. &c. are articles of universal demand. This commerce has been steadily pursued under re-

peated disasters, for more than a century; and the frustration of various attempts to establish dominion in various places of those countries has only caused a change in the manner of her operations, without abating her desire or her hopes; for the policy was founded on commercial principles, and must be desirable as long as commerce consists in exchanges: she has therefore sought to profit by all vicissitudes in those countries; at one momont she is seen conciliating Spain, while influencing the councils of Madrid, and her armies are invading Buenos Ayres and stimulating Chili to independence, her generals are instructed, at Monte Video, at Buenos Ayres, and St. Jago, to overthrow the authority of Spain. The frustration of her enterprizes there, have had no other effect than to change her course of policy; but she found in the South, the same experience, as thirty years before in the North, that an independent people were preferable customers to a mercantile nation, before subjected colonists.

The plan connected with her attack upon Buenos Ayres was stupendous. She contemplated the possession of four great bastions on the flanks of the South American continent, by which she could control the policy and command the commerce of the whole vast range. Trinidad formed the north east position, having the mouths of the Orinoco and the Maragnon on the East coast, the gulf of Paria, and the sea as far as Cape Vela on the North, which would be further kept under review by the occupation of Panama, forming the north west bastion, supported by that long grafted scion of British policy the Bay of Hondurus. Montevideo and Buenos Ayres were to form the south east points of surveillance and influ-

ence; and the Archipelago of Chiloe, was to form the rampart and rendezvous of her power in the South and West Pacific. Trinidad alone is possessed of these great influential positions; and it was no trivial indication of the profoundness of her views, that the laws of Spain were retained in Trinidad, and ordered to be retained in Buenos Ayres and Chili, had her arms been successful there. The occupation of the Dutch colonies of Berbice, Demarara, and Essiquibo, belonged to the same system; and there are agents of her policy, who look to the grants of territories under the denomination of Missions, on the south of the Orinoco, who may one day seek to unite their destinies with the British colonies of Guayana. The concerns of the British in various plans of Miranda, the succors afforded him, and the celebrated proclamation of Governor Picton at Trinidad, inviting Caracas and Cumana to revolt against Spain, afford ample evidence of their objects, their extent, and the pertinacity of their designs and the value they set upon them.

Numerous facts of a corresponding character might be adduced to show the importance which she attaches to South American commerce, and the constancy of her pursuit; every day's experience shows how much more early and how much more justly she has appreciated the value of those regions to commercial enterprize, than any of her contemporaries. Her first designs appear to have contemplated coercion and dominion, similar to that in which she has succeeded so wonderfully in India, and a gradual growth of domination under the name of protection or alliance. The reverses which she experienced taught her to change that system. She had entered India with a cargo of hardware and haberdashery, and in less than thirty years became an armed ally, and final-

ly, in about seventy years, the undisputed sovereign of 130,000,000 of people. But this immense population and the vast provinces which they occupy, require vast armies, arsenals, and agents to govern them; and these exhaust the revenues; it is only by the commerce which Asia affords, that England acquires any riches from those fine and fruitful dominions—she gains nothing in the way of revenue.

Perhaps the convictions of this experience may not be thrown away. The application of them may compensate the mortification arising from the frustration of military designs; but it has not, nor can it tend to abate her policy of commerce; but rather to bind her more firmly to that independence which now alone may yield more direct and less encumbered benefits. Yet it is certain that at a period not very distant she sought to obtain, by negociation and promises of particular efforts in their favor, and the offer of a guarantee of the independence of the South American states, certain important positions on the Main; a very modest but very determined denial appears to have quashed those expectations, but without affecting her policy of commerce or her interest in the independence of the new states.

Under all the vicissitudes of human affairs, we perceive the commerce of England proceeds with accumulating effects. The products of the new world continue to be exchanged for the manufactures of England, and to employ, feed, and pay the British artisans, whose skill and labor constitute the main sources of British commerce, wealth, and power, and collect those revenues by which she has moved the world. Perhaps it is beyond any measure which statesmen have yet formed or imagined, how immense the riches are which may be derived to com-

merce from the new states, and the influence which their emancipation may have upon the whole world. It is very evident, however, that no statesmen understand it so well, nor appreciate and pursue it with so much judgment, as the statesmen of England. She will not, therefore, be disposed to weaken, much less to endanger or diminish, the vast share she already holds in the commerce of the new world; for it is very obvious to her, that if to 18 millions of people, but recently rescued from thraldom, she can send from one port, $ 34,000,000 in one year; that when settled in peace, the same course of population and extension of the arts of civilized life must be in nearly a similar progression with that of North America, which has, in 40 years, grown up from three to ten millions, and a commerce more than proportionably augmented.

From these considerations, it is a fair and reasonable inference, that it cannot be compatible with British policy, to encourage, countenance, or connive at, much less to participate in, any conspiracy or designs of the Holy Alliance against any part of America, North or South.

But inferences have been made from the conduct of Great Britain in relation to Naples, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Russia, and Austria, which seem to render questionable her dispositions towards South America. A fair examination will immediately reconcile these imaginary contradictions. The policy of England is always individual, her power, her commerce upon which that power depends, is sole and exclusive; whatever may be the fate or fortunes of other nations, where her own interests are not involved, her policy will not interfere.

It has been asked—why did England arm at one time to sustain Spain against France, and when attacked by France a second time, permit her to be vanquished by French armies? Why did England, that countenances South American independence, forsake Naples? But these paradoxes are merely apparent, and by no means in contradiction with British policy. Naples had no commerce interesting to England. Spain, by the loss of her South American possessions, was placed exactly in the same position as Naples. The Neapolitans are a very ingenious people, and under a free or wise government might become rivals in many arts, to those of Great Britain. Spain, under a free and wise administration, might again become what she was in the 16th century—the clothier, the armourer, and the toyshop, as well as the military school, and arsenal of European nations; her looms and her workshops, which fell upon the expulsion of the Moors and the acquisition of South America, might be again restored in the same manner as in France, and thus compensate, by industry at home, for the debasing poverty produced by colonies abroad. Contemporaneously with the revolution of North America, Spain was a formidable naval power; combined with the navy of France, her fleets witnessed the flight of the proud navy of England under Admirals Geary and Darby, and the British channel was swept by their combined fleet. Under a Bourbon, Spain launched in one day, and from one arsenal, twelve ships of the line of 74 guns each, and the date of this event is not remote—for one of those vessels, the *San Pablo*, is still afloat. Capacities so evident, so ample, and so easily drawn forth, could present no motive for the interference and support of British statesmen, whose

policy it must ever be kept in view, admits of no measures that may interfere with her commerce or endanger her power. The very same policy, which led the British armies into Spain at one period, prevented their entrance in the other. The family compact of the Bourbons, formed at the close of the reign of George II, produced during the ministry of Pitt, a sanguinary war. The event which occurred in 1779, the sweeping of the British channel by the Bourbon fleets, Pitt foresaw was possible, and to prevent it was the object of the war; and for the time he did prevent it; but the accomplishment which followed, and the drawn battle even between the French grand fleet under D'Orvillers, and the English fleet under Keppel, furnished ample motives for England to interfere, when a more formidable family compact was in operation with the Bonapartes. Under that dynasty Spain would have been identified with France in power and policy. Spain, under that dynasty, would have kept pace with France in great public undertakings, in magnificent roads and bridges, and canals, in the resuscitation of arts and sciences, and the extension of commerce and naval power. Spain, under a Bonaparte, would have possessed that very South America, of which Britain has been with unwearied perseverance seeking for more than an age. It was to prevent these consequences that English armies entered Spain, not to render Spain free, or happy; it was to prevent Spain from becoming rich and powerful, that the blood and treasure of England were lavished in the Peninsula. Under such monarchs as Ferdinand VII, Spain can never be formidable to any people but Spaniards or Portuguese, such a des-

pot becomes a guarantee of national wretchedness and imbecility. Under a Bonaparte Spain would rank among the first powers of Europe. Under a Bourbon she is of no more consequence than Wirtemberg or Sardinia in the scale of nations.

Here then is a solution of the enigma supposed to be found in British policy, when on the last Bourbon invasion she forbore to aid Spain with armies and subsidies. In fact, and in despite of the thousands of theories which have been set up, to account for the hostility of England to the French revolution, the true cause is to be found in the same policy, in the apprehensions that France with all her faculties in a state of freedom,—all her vassals become freemen,—the 30,000,000 composing her population would become the most formidable manufacturing and commercial rival, that she had yet to contend with; it was not hatred of mere democratic government; it was not the love of kings, which actuated British statesmen; it was the jealousy of commerce and its rivalship, and of the power which internal industry must create among such a people, and the faculties which France must possess under the progress of the sciences and the spirit of the age, which excited her to arms. Thirty millions of people emancipated from feudal, noble, and ecclesiastical bondage, become secure in their personal acquirements, in the unrestrained exercise of their faculties for their individual benefit, would render France fourfold more formidable than she has been under the despotism. The clamors of the ministerialists of England against democracy, and echoed by her emissaries or those in sympathy with monarchy in other countries, was the language of masquerade, and of dupes who believed the masque-

rade a reality; it was a studied delusion—the freedom of a whole people a cause of apprehension! The extinction of those very debilitating institutions of noble and priestly hierachies, and the long train of vassalage, which had afforded Great Britain for more than a century materials for satire, for dramatic and graphic caricature, were at length held forth as a cause of apprehension! Yet so it was, and notwithstanding the war waged for thirty years against France, after all her glories and sacrifices and disasters, she is at this moment the least incumbered and the most prosperous nation in Europe; but she is proceeding so rapidly in the internal career of industry, that it cannot but lead at no remote day to other desperate wars.

In the early part of the 18th century France, under all the disadvantages of despotism, rivalled England in the commerce of the Levant. It was the French who created that novel system of forming armies of native troops in India, officered by Europeans. It is by emulating, by imitating, and improving upon the plans of La Bourdonnay and Dupleix that England became the successor and sovereign of the Mogul. The Levant sea at that period was commonly denominated a French sea: England became her rival, and in a great measure supplanted her there; it was a struggle that had not terminated, at the beginning of the French Revolution, and has not terminated yet; the contention remains in commerce, though a common interest unites them in political relations to Turkey and against Russia.

The policy of England is equally surprizing for its flexibility and consistency; at first view it appears the offspring of an irregular or a wanton capriciousness; but a closer examination proves it to be the re-

sult of the most active sagacity and profound wisdom. Why, it may be asked, does England—Missionary—Bible-society—negro-emancipating—liberty-boasting England, pursue the policy which she has displayed in relation to Greece? Why does she, under the pretext of protecting the Cephalonian isles, hold a position on the very borders of Greece, from which emissaries, under color of neutrality, and her flag,—under the pretence of protecting her commerce,—lend succors to the Barbarian Moslems, and repress the struggles of Christian Greece? But these moral contradictions are perfectly consistent with British policy; which uses missions and fashionable fanaticism, when and wherever they subserve her purposes; but which possess no value when they interfere with the springs of her power. Her resolution goes to sustain, augment, and perpetuate British power, and to depress whatever may endanger it. It was this policy that overturned Holland as a commercial and naval power, and transferred both attributes of greatness to herself; she has done no more in relation to France, Spain, and Naples, than she is now doing in relation to Turkey and Greece.

Greece comprehends a multitude of islands and a rich picturesque country on the shores of the Mediterranean sea; a population proverbially acute and enterprizing, ingenious and active. Their position has addicted them to maratime pursuits, and they are at the same time the most expert navigators and constructors of vessels of the most beautiful models. In beauty, neatness of equipment and dextrous navigation, they are frequently compared with the Americans of the New England states, whom they alone resemble in shrewdness and thrift. In their own

seas they have no superiors, and during the wars of the French revolution, the Greek seamen who found their way on board the British ships of war, (and they were numerous,) were not surpassed in any quality required to constitute an able seaman. Their pride of ancestry is strong and general; as merchants they are shrewd and intelligent. The fleets of Turkey, and the merchantmen belonging to Turks, have always been navigated by Greeks. Their religion, called that of the Greek church, is the same as that of Russia. The Greeks are unanimous in abhorrence of the Turks, and much attached to Russia.

The position of Constantinople had made it an object of solicitude and constant desire to the leaders of the Russian tribes, long before Peter had introduced his nation among those of Europe; with him and with every monarch, male and female, who has succeeded to the Russian throne, it has been an object constant and dominant.

The character and proximity of the Greeks to Russia, and the known ambition of the latter power, in relation to Turkey in Europe, are circumstances of deep apprehension to Great Britain, and upon the very same principles which have governed her policy towards Holland, France, and Spain. The statesmen of England see in the vast basin of the Euxine, the future rendezvous of numerous fleets, and shores surrounded by numerous dock yards, contiguous to vast forests containing all that is required of nature for naval equipments. The whole of the northern, a great part of the eastern and western extremities, are Russian dominion in acknowledged possession—that is, nearly from the Phasis of Colchis in the east, to the mouth of the Danube in the west. Russia, possessed of Constan-

tinople, could by skilful fortifications seal up the strait of the Bosporus, exclude all other ships therefrom; and—possessed of ample sea room for the fleets of the whole world, free from rock or shoal, and the vicissitudes of northern climes;—from this vast basin, she might pass through the Propontis at any season, and give law to the Grecian Archipelago and the whole Mediterranean coasts.

The Greeks, united by that association of ideas which is the general effect of religious sentiment, bordering on Thrace, would, without any violence, but from the mere effect of position, become the navigators of Russian, as they have been of Turkish ships; and whether, as a free Republic, or as a dependant province of Russia, released from the barbarous yoke of Turkey, they could not avoid, even if it should appear desirable, an intimacy with the commercial and naval affairs of Russia. Their naval habits, their mercantile enterprize, would lead them to the Euxine; and the coasts of that spacious inland sea, would be soon seen to emulate the magnificence of the Genoese on the same celebrated theatre; the Tauride would again become the resort of Eastern caravans, and again rival in splendor the Persian and Syrian states. The policy of Russia would cherish the genius and enterprize of Greece; and from the cupidity already betrayed by Russia, in attempting to convert a vast portion of the Pacific ocean into a close sea, it may be anticipated, that she would not want more plausible pretexts in the waters of the Levant; this recent event, were there not many others, would necessarily justify the apprehensions of British statesmen. They could not but recall to view the influence and effect of the armed neutrality of 1780, in which Russia appeared the

leader, and the principles of which the present Emperor so recently as the peace made at Tilsit, professed to be the perpetual policy of Russia. Russia, possessed of Constantinople, would occupy Thrace, and the river Strymon would be the only line of separation between Greece and Russia.

In such a position she must become a vast and formidable naval power. Greece, free or subjected, would, from inevitable necessity, become her auxiliary in commerce and naval power. But Greece, independent, would be still more formidable, and united with Russia they must very soon form the most powerful navy that has ever appeared on the ocean.

The same fears which led England to destroy the commercial and naval supremacy of Holland, to make war against the French revolution, and to suffer the recent prostration of Spain, must necessarily prevail in relation to Russia: the policy which made war to avert the family compact of Bourbons in 1756, and the family compact of Bonapartes in 1808, could not fail to anticipate the dangers of Russian success against Turkey, and Russian alliance with Greece. Hence England becomes the active mediator and protector of the Turks, and prevents their expulsion from Europe; hence she looks coldly on the massacres and rapine, and enslavement of Christian Greeks; but therefore her policy is constant and consistent.

The statesmen of England also see in the Euxine, besides a great naval arsenal, the central rendezvous of Asiatic commerce, from the sea of Aral and the Caspian, the Gulf of Persia and the Arabian sea, thence to the Baltic. They may apprehend such an event, as only the prelude to as great a revolution in commerce

as took place when the passage round the South Capes of Africa was discovered; they may apprehend future wars as disastrous and sanguinary as those signalized by the renown of the De Ruyters and Van Tromps; triumphs which were but the expiring struggles of a power, from whom naval supremacy was about to be wrested forever.

Greece become free and sole, would, like the United States, find her faculties more plastic and her horizon enlarged. Instead of her naval adventures being confined within the pillars of Hercules, or a few rare visits to the Atlantic ports of Spain and Portugal, her sails would soon whiten distant seas. Commercial jealousy would see in every cargo of this new risen power, so much subducted from her accustomed navigation, so much wealth and enterprize accumulating to her danger.

Nor would British statesmen feel less apprehension on the Asiatic side of Russia. That naval basin, in which all the navies of the world might ride, would menace her commerce and dominion in Asia, or at least awaken lively apprehensions. Already the contact of Russian power in Circassia and Georgia, and the diplomatic movements in Persia have raised fears which have induced several British diplomatic missions to the court of Persia and the powers contiguous to the Indian dominion. Georgians and Circassians are now Russians, and the Armenians are by inclination already in sympathy with Russia. The Czar has undertaken to establish new lines of demarcation between Asia and Europe, by which a great range of Ancient Asia is now brought within the boundaries of Europe. While Russian armies on the

mouths of the Danube, in Bulgaria, and Budziac Tartary, in the Tauride, and on the borders of Armenia, keep Turkey in a state of siege; her agents on the Caspian conciliate the confidence of the Persians and put their armies in motion on the eastern extremities of Asia Minor; thus Turkey is exposed to all the expenses and apprehensions of war, by the mere parade of a Russian army in sight of the Byzantine Minarets, and a Persian army constantly in motion, at a thousand miles distant from the Turkish capital.

Nor does Great Britain deem it necessary to dissemble in the case of Turkey. Not to see the cause of apprehension from Russia, would be to be blind; and not to resist, would be to acquiese. Her minister at the Porte explicitly delares her determination, that Great Britain will not be an indifferent spectator of any attempt upon Thrace. The same policy declares to the Holy Alliance that she will not be an indifferent spectator to the interferencec of any other European power between Spain and America: and it is obvious that Spain can do nothing alone. The policy of England is the same. She does not dispute the right of Russia to occupy her own territory in any mode or form, in civil or military array; but she declares that the parade of armies on the borders of Turkey, has the more than suspicious appearance of hostile designs, and by compelling Turkey to keep up an army of observation, subjects her to all the pecuniary injuries of actual war.

The possession of the Caspian sea by Russia exclusively, enables Russia to maintain a permanent influence in Persia. Beyond the present dominion of Persia, and bordering upon India Proper, is the Afghan nation, which has at different periods ruled and

been subjected to Persia; but is now a formidable, hardy, numerous, and independent nation, extending its power and authority from Khorassan to Cashmire and the sources of the Punjab, or Five Rivers, which unite in the Indus. England cultivates with favor this nation, and abstains from every interference but for the peace and benefit of the country, heretofore torn by ambitious and contending rivals and usurpers. In Persia England also holds such correspondence as guards against surprise. From this quarter the British possessions in India have little to apprehend. She is perfectly aware of the difficulties which an invader must have to overcome in such an attempt; but adopting that sound maxim of the general, that *nothing is improbable which is not impossible*, she keeps a vigilant eye upon Russia in Asia. The native troops disciplined by the British, are inferior to none on earth, for steady valor, subordination, temperance, and disregard of danger or death. Their confidence in their European officers is unparalleled; and she conciliates by favor, and governs without constraint or violence, those hardy tribes which occupy the plains from Khorassan and Moultan, and the ancient Parapamissus, to the defiles of the modern Hindoo Koosh. The Afghans owe to British policy the greatest gratitude, for arresting the ever recurring revolutions which afflicted them since their separation from Persian authority. In the name of mediator she really benefits them, exercising her influence with extraordinary discretion, but thus actually governs them. She exacts nothing from them, and is the guarantee of their peace and security against personal or factious ambition; and under the title of allies, they are as disposable for her service in

the event of war, as the troops organized in her own provinces. In fact, these tribes, and all those that occupy the Northern and Western frontiers of India, enjoy a peace and security unknown to those regions from the first Mahomedan inroads; they are no longer plunderers nor plundered; and they are conscious that their present felicity is attributable to British power alone. Indeed the whole immense population of India, under British rule, enjoy a security and happiness unknown to them for centuries, at least since the first invasion by the Moslems. And their gratitude is as fervent as their contentment and prosperity are unexampled. It is due to truth to say, that however odious and abominable the early periods of British power in India may have been, that from the days of Cornwallis' administration, England has merited, as she has obtained, their unbounded confidence and gratitude.

Notwithstanding the extent and efficiency of British policy in Asia, and the securities she has made against military invasion, England, nevertheless, apprehends a species of danger from that quarter which is not so distinctly perceptible, nor such as she openly avows. It is not from the prowess or the numbers of Russian battalions or squadrons she apprehends any thing; to those, the march across the Indus would not be less arduous or hazardous than to the Macedonians, for the country at this day is very nearly the same in its condition as in the days of Alexander. Those countries he found it as difficult to enter or to occupy, as to hold when entered: and the modern Alexander, would, like him, discover very soon, that those floods which opened for his passage into Moultan, after he had surmounted ma-

ny great perils, would close upon his rear; and that like him, before he had made a week's march towards the Ganges, a precipitate and desperate retreat could alone rescue him from a fate like that of Cambyses, only to furnish a moral for future invaders, and a problem, to exercise the ingenuity of the historian.

But the concealed cause of British apprehension, from the side of Russia, is of a nature not less serious than armed invasion. The statesmen of England constantly apprehend, from what particular cause is not explained, that there is a tendency among all classes of Europeans and others, in India, to revolution and independence of European power. The revolutions which have grown out of that of North America, have been discussed with as much freedom in Asia, as in any other part of the globe; the viceregal agent in constant alarm and fear; and arbitrary power has been frequently interposed to repress all discussions of that delicate topic. The press has been subjected to violence as extreme by British power, as in Turkey, Venice, Vienna, or Rome. The effects of such acts cannot be effective upon a generation yet unborn: the living creature may be silent, but he cannot unknow what he knows, nor unthink what he thinks; and the climate is peculiarly adapted to favor the development and exercise of intellect. Indications, it is said, have been shown of the disposition to independence; and a crisis is spoken of by persons long resident in that country, which had nearly led to the catastrophe so much feared. This crisis is said to have arisen under the administration of Cornwallis, and was unwarily produced by some high handed measures upon which he had unadvisedly fallen, but from which he extricated

himself with consummate prudence, by a timely redress of the grievances, which he had been first opposed, and by a judicious surrender of a vicious military system.

If such a disposition should still prevail in Hindustan, in this revolutionary age, and Russia undertake to fan the flame of revolt on any emergency, the tremendous consequences are not to be measured; the richest foreign possessions ever held by any European nation might then, like South America, furnish the materials for many nations, more populous and rich than the proudest nations of Europe. This subject is full of curious materials, upon which much might be said and shown; but enough for the present purpose has been here said, to sustain the principle held forth in this paper, that Great Britain in her policy, has interests to maintain wholly irreconcilable with the aggrandizement of Russia, and more cause to apprehend danger from her than from any power of Europe.

Here then are the facts which it is conceived furnish a solution of the supposed enigma of British policy, which exhibits England exciting the world, and boasting more than any other nation, of her vital christianity; at the same moment sustaining the tottering fabric of the Moslems in Europe, the barbarous assassins of Christian Greeks; preferring to see the soil and the descendants of Socrates, Aristides, and Miltiades, degraded and butchered by Mahomedan barbarity, in order that her commercial exchanges and naval superiority may have no new rival.

As the almost exclusive possession of American commerce forbids England to connive at any assault upon any part of America; so the preservation of the

commerce in the Levant, which she already possesses, and is resolved not to abandon, is perfectly consistent with her general system in all parts of the earth.

The influence of Austria does not, in truth, require much regard. Russia acquiesces in her pretensions rather from prudence than with approbation. Austria, by her family experience in Tuscany, had acquired a propensity to maritime commerce, because that has been the principal source of aggrandisement during the two last centuries. Austria sought, about forty years ago, to open a commerce with Asia, by the Cape of Good Hope, and she established an India company for that purpose at Ostend. England, jealous of rivalship in the Indian seas, compelled Austria to abandon the company and the commerce. Yet Austria did not forsake her designs, and her hopes were gratified in an extraordinary degree by the acquisition of Venice. This possession of a large portion of the Adriatic coast, only excited new desires for the prolongation of her possessions into Epirus, and even to Peloponnessus. Here again England interposed, and in the flush of her continental successes, seized upon the occasion to transfer to her *protection* the Cephalonian isles, then held by Russia, and thereby accomplished at once four great objects of her policy—she excluded Russia from a position in the Mediterranean, which gave her an influence over Grecce—she occupied that place and that influence herself—she arrested the policy of Austria—and placed centinels over Greece to controul her destinies; and perhaps her statesmen did not fail to call to mind that the Venetian fleet which, in 1551, gained the battle of Lepanto, over a superior Turkish fleet, was under the command of an Austrian prince.

Precautions manifested so early as these must have been suggested, by apprehensions of those very powers whom she had subsidized against France, and with whom unreflecting men suppose her now ready to form an alliance destructive to herself. The facts here given are however too significant to be misapprehended; and they show also how early British policy anticipated the revolution in Greece.

It is not necessary to dwell very circumstantially on the strange coincidence of interests and policy between England and France, in relation to Russia, Turkey, and Greece. The commerce of the Levant has been, and continues to be, an object of contention and rivalship between France and Englnnd more than a century. The ascendency of France in the middle of the last century, was such, that it was considered in ordinary discourse as a French sea. English enterprize, during the ministry of Sir R. Walpole, and the degeneracy of the court of Louis XV, transferred the preponderancy to England, and to so great an extent, that when a temporary activity was produced by the genius of Turgot, and other kindred spirits, the industry of France once again resumed great national vigor; but the French manufactures were carried into the Levant and disposed of under English names. The revolution gave France a temporary predominancy again; but subsequent events have rather equalized them, while the dread of a common rival in Russia, unites the two nations in support of Turkey.

The views here taken, are, it is presumed, sufficiently simple and obvious. The facts are generally of contemporaneous notoriety—the inferences are left with the judgment of the reader. England has an in-

terest in common with the two Americas, founded in commerce, the sole source of her power and prosperity. The colonies of Great Britain, so far from being beneficial, are comparatively a burden, to her, from which she manifests an inclination to disencumber herself, and would release herself immediately, if there were not dangers and difficulties in the relinquishment which render it safer "to bear the ills she suffers, than to enter upon others which she knows not of." These remarks apply specially to Canada and the West Indies, both of which she would be glad to find a safe and plausible motive for relinquishing.

The policy of territorial possession she appears to think has been too indiscriminate, and seems resolved to confine herself to Asia and the south of Africa, with such islands in every sea as may serve for entrepots to her merchants and rendezvous to her navy; or occasional points from which to direct her political agency. America has taught her, and not her own first conceptions, that it is by commercial exchanges she can derive advantage from any foreign nation, particularly in the new world; and she appears to act in that spirit.

There is then no reason to believe or to suspect, that England can be disposed to enter into any views hostile to her own system; that is, the interests of her commerce. The independence and prosperity of the two Americas, have progressively augmented the riches and power of Great Britain, and must continue to augment in proportion with their population, and as civilization spreads. She finds in America at large, markets which more than compensate for those she has lost in Europe; and experience has taught her

that these markets must multiply in magnitude and riches which does not apyly to any other part of the world. To suppose that England would conspire against America, in any part, under such circumstances, would be to suppose that she would seek her own destruction: the same reasons then which prevail in her American policy govern her policy in Europe.

Whether she entertains any latent designs to obtain territorial possession or political supremacy in any part of South America, after her past experience, is a matter not to be immediately decided; it is not a part of the considerations proposed to be examined in this paper. Cases may be very easily imagined which might lead to such a policy. Any attempt of the Allied Powers (if such a chimera could be conceived) might induce her to seek the occupation of the four great points of La Plata, Chiloe, and Panama, with Trinidad already held. But their possession for commercial purposes, so long as she has no powerful rival more favored, or pretending to territorial occupancy, is not even politic nor economical. In a case of rivalship, her policy would indeed lead her to contend, as she contended necessarily with the Dutch and French in Asia, until she destroyed their rivalship. The designs entertained upon Chiloe, were probably connected with the apprehensions, for which there were some grounds, of the succors which Napoleon had ordered to be dispatched with arms to the revolutionists. At the period when Napoleon fought the disastrous battle of Leipsic, there were two new frigates in the French ports with each 10,000 stand of arms, and a number of well prepared officers. One of these was destined for *Chiloe*, the other for *Marga-*

rita. The disasters of that battle gave to the agents who were intrusted with this supply, an impunity to indulge in passions hostile to the liberty of mankind, they landed the arms, and the agency of England was too active to be ignorant of the transactions.

That England entertained designs upon Panama, at a period very recent, is indisputable; and it is no less certain, that the knowledge of the fact precipitated the rising of the people in Panama and Veragua, by which the Spanish authority was terminated there, more early than it otherwise would have been, and their identification with the Columbian Republic accelerated. It is also said, that amicable overtures were more recently made for the provisional occupation of some other positions, prior to the expulsion of Morales from Puerto Cabello. This fact has been before alluded to in this paper. It is by no means impossible that Great Britain may indulge in designs formed in the early stages of Mexican revolution. A naval depot was at no remote period contemplated to be established near the Trinity river, which Spain had long proposed, under the name of New Cadiz, at the same place. The missionaries which Great Britain has sent to Mexico, must have a powerful influence in promoting any designs she may contemplate of that nature; or of a nature which it may be preferable to surmise rather than suggest. Yet, the probability is, that from an apprehension of exciting an alarm in an adjacent quarter, she would silently proceed without any territoriol acquisition, to obtain a great commercial and political influence in that country; the effects of which can be estimated only by those who are intimately acquainted with Mexico and its population, but which re-

quires from the United States a more efficient agency in that quarter.

In fine, no coercion of any part of America is to be apprehended from the Holy Alliance.

The market of North America, is preferable to England over that of all Europe, and is augmenting in quantity and value.

The market of South America is already equal to that of North America, at the commencement of the French Revolution, and must augment in greater proportion, as its products are more various, abundant, and desirable universally.

England from the redundancy of the precious metals, which she has obtained wholly by the exchanges of her manufactures, can now reduce the interest of money to three and an half per cent.

Led by the common infatuation which pervades our country, to bestow more attention on foreign affairs than on what most intimately and seriously concerns us, it may not be useless to bestow a few thoughts on *home concerns*, from which our first free government has been for 40 years so much diverted, as not to have even a department for home affairs. Our national policy is perhaps the least unlike that of Wise Nations of any on earth in these respects: Yet there is a propensity to imitation of British institutions in every thing but those things which would make us great, prosperous, and wealthy. To show how her policy operates, and how wisely it is guided, the following facts appear to fall under observation, since the preceding was written or were given to the press.

The number of families in England and Wales (without Scotland and Ireland) are thus employed:

On agriculture principally,	Families	847,957
On manufactures and trade . . .		1,159,975
Not comprised in either		485,491
	Families	2,493,423

Population in 1821, . . Persons, 11,977,663
Average persons in a family 5.20½ hundreths.

A recent writer states as follows:

33 per cent. of the population of England, or 7,666,666 employed on agriculture, produce food for . . .	Persons	21,500,000
83 per cent. of the United States population produce food for	10,000,000	
Exports of United States estimated at $ 40,000,000 would feed	850,000	
		10,850,000

Thus the farmer of England feeds 3 *families.*
The farmer of the United States feeds $1\frac{30}{100}$ *families.*

The following economical facts, afford other means by which to show the importance of industry. The counties of Bedford, Cambridge, and Huntingdon, in England, are the three least manufacturing counties; and the Poor Rate of each family averages	*l* 3 13*s* 5*d*
While in Middlesex, York, and Devonshire, the three great manufacturing counties, the Poor Rate of each family averages	*l* 1 4*s* 4¾*d*

A system equally provident and national, would exalt the United States to a high state of prosperity, for which the present period is particularly propitious. Industry, if it were but half as well protected

here, as in England, would, in five years, give 500,000 persons to productive industry, who now earn next to nothing. Three dollars a week, expended by that number of persons, on common necessaries, would circulate 78,000,000 of dollars additional, in the year. The labor of the same hands would produce not less than 150,000,000 of dollars, but might yield 200,000,000 of dollars; and of the products of this home industry, 40 or 50 millions, in addition to our present exports, would find their way into foreign countries.

And these operations, while they provided markets for agriculture, and freights for ships, would not diminish any raw material, while it would furnish an immense market abroad and at home.

But nothing can astonish the experienced mind so much as the imperfect views, the cold concern, the inconceivable indifference which prevails in the United States, on the commercial advantages which our position holds forth in South America, but particularly in Guatamala and Mexico. Men in future times, and not very remote times, will not fail to be confounded on reviewing the apathy, insensibility, or infatuation, which prevails on this subject in the present times.

WASHINGTON CITY,
17*th March*, 1824.